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The Performance of Venture Capital Funds and VC-backed IPOs:  
Evidence from China 
Lou Weng Hong, Stanley 
 
Abstract 
This study is divided into three parts based on the listed companies on the Small and 
Medium Enterprise Board on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China. The first part 
is to study the investment performance of Venture Capital Funds. I found that the 
investment return in terms of investment multiple and annual rate of return is better 
than those in the US market, and also the VC investment portfolios outperform the 
public equity market. Furthermore, I compare the performance of non VC-backed 
IPOs and non VC-backed IPOs by using the Buy-and Hold Abnormal Return and 
Wealth Relatives. Both measurements show that the VC-backed are better than non 
VC-backed. Moreover, I try to establish a link between the performance and a set of 
independent variables such as investment amount, duration and etc. In the second 
part, I try to compare the performance of VC-backed and non VC-backed companies 
listed on the Small and Medium Enterprise Board on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
in the two years following the public listing. 
Keywords: Venture Capital, IPO, Multiple, Annual Rate of Return 
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I. Introduction 
The invention of Venture Capital (VC) can be dated back to 1946 when Georges 
Diriot established the first prototype of modern venture capital company, American 
Research and Development Corporation (ARDC). Nowadays, the venture capital is 
widely attracting the attention of investors, entrepreneurs and academia because it is 
regarded as a high-return investment, an important finance source of start-up 
companies and one of the key factors to propel the technology innovation.  
It is not surprised that the venture capital industry has developed well in western 
countries especially in the US, because it originated there. With the abundant 
financial source, relevant immediate professionals, and advanced legislation to 
protect the stakeholders’ right, the venture capital market in the US is very mature 
and there is fruitful research upon the venture capital. But in China, the second 
largest economy in the world, the research about the venture capital in the domestic 
market is still relatively limited. The greatest problem may be due to the lack of 
information about the investment and the relatively short history of this sunrise 
industry. Thus, it is interesting to probe into this tremendous-potential market to see 
how the venture capital funds run their business in this emerging country. 
This paper is organized as follows. In this introduction part, I would like to introduce 
the basic concept of the venture capital and the current situation in China. Next I will 
review some literatures. The third part is the data source and descriptive statistic 
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about the samples. After that I will discuss my methodology and present the results. 
And finally it comes and conclusion. 
 
1. What is Venture Capital? 
According to Black and Gilson’s (1998) paper, Venture Capital (VC) is a kind of 
financial capital managed by specialized venture capital organizations (i.e. venture 
capital funds) which always make investments in the high-growth, high-risk, high-
potential, and often high-technology firms that need capital to finance product 
development or growth and must, by the nature of their business, obtain this capital 
largely in the form of equity other than debt. 
Generally, the venture capital funds are managed by experts specialized in specific 
fields such as financial management and technology expertise. Different from the 
Angel investment, venture capital funds usually (but not always) invest the target 
companies in their growth stage (Series A round) after the seed funding stage. In 
most cases, the venture capital funds hold their stake of the equity of the investment 
targets and realize their return and profit through an eventual realization event such 
IPO or trade sale of the companies. 
Venture Capital originated in the US. In 1946, Georges Diriot, the former Dean of 
Harvard Business School, established the first Venture Capital Company, American 
Research and Development Corporation (ARDC). Since then, venture capital funds 
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have been more and more popular. In 2010, venture capital funds made a total 
investment of $21.8 billion with 3,277 deals, increasing by 19% and 12 % over 2009, 
respectively in America.
1
 
 
2. Venture Capital in China 
The foundation of China’s Venture Capital (VC) can be dated back to the mid of 
1980’s. In 1983, the State Science and Technology Commission established a 
research group to Research Group of Countermeasures to the Influence of the New 
Technology Revolution in order to carefully study the international technology 
situation. (Fensterstock and Li, 2001) In 1985, the Central Government in China 
established the first state-own venture capital, China New Technology Venture 
Capital Company and some local government and state-own enterprise also set up 
some venture capital companies in the coming decade. But during this period, the 
pace of the venture capital development was still very slow in China until early 
1990’s in which some foreign investment companies, venture capital institutions and 
funds started to seek opportunities in China. In 1992, the Pacific Technology 
Venture Capital Fund subordinate to IDG Capital entered China and cooperated with 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong government to set up several venture capital 
companies focusing on the technology industry investment. 
                                                             
1 Source: Peter Delevett, “Venture capital investment in 2010 grew for first time in three years” 21 
Feb, 2011. http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_17443791?nclick_check=1 . 
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In the past three decades, the market has been growing rapidly, in terms of 
investment scope, investment amount and number of investments. Total venture 
capital investment amount in China grew from nearly nothing in 1990 to US$858 
million in 2000, and the most recent number in 2010 became the highest record, with 
US$5.387 billion and 817 deals, breaking the previous record of US$ 4.21 billion 
and 607 deals in 2008.   
The history of venture capital in China can be divided into three parts. 
1. Before Year 2000 
The road for the venture capital is not smooth in China. According to 
Fensterstock and Li (2001), the factors affecting the venture capital includes: 
 Absence of law and regulations 
 Lack of exit mechanism 
 Lack of qualified investors 
 Service provided by intermediate system such as law firms, 
management consultants, financial and accounting advisors, business 
analysts, and project evaluators who are supposed to actively involve 
in the venture capital investment cannot meet market demand. 
 Lack of talent managers 
 Ignorance of intellectual property rights 
2. From Year 2000 to 2005 
Amid the burst of technology stock bubble, the delayed invention of growth 
enterprise board, the venture capital funds accumulated more and more 
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experience, began to gear to the international standards, and remained a 
stable pace to develop. 
3. After Year 2005 
As the Small and Medium Enterprise Board was open in Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, the venture capital funds now have a more convenient exit 
mechanism. Furthermore, the venture capital also benefit from the 
ameliorated legislation. The domestic venture capital funds now attract the 
market players’ eyeball also help the venture capital industry and market 
become more mature and flourishing. 
 
 
Source: Zero2IPO Group. www.zero2ipogroup.com 
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Source: Zero2IPO Group. www.zero2ipogroup.com 
 
As the graphs above show that there is a upward trend of the venture capital industry 
in terms of new venture capital, capital raised, investment deals, and investment 
amount over the last decade, except 2009 in which the industry is heavily affected by 
the financial tsunami. The investment deals, investment amount, number of new 
venture capital and capital raised dropped by 21.4%, 35.8%, 27.6% and 19.9% 
respectively. 
In China, Venture capital fund raising is divided into RMB-denominated and USD-
denominated. According to the statistics provided by Zero2IPO Group
2
, USD-
denominated venture capital was the majority in the market before, but the situation 
                                                             
2 Zero2IPO Group. www.zero2ipogroup.com 
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became vice versa in terms of number of new venture capital funds and capital raised 
in 2007 and 2009 respectively. In fact, it is because the USD-denominated capital 
raised in 2009 dropped dramatically by 54% during the financial turmoil that the 
total capital raised decreased in this year. The fundraising of RMB-denominated 
capital ventures has continued to increase during the past 5 years. But the average 
amount of each USD-denominated fundraising still exceeds the RMB one.  
For the geographically distribution of venture capital investment, Beijing, 
Guangdong and Shanghai, which are the most developed areas in China,  attract most 
of the investment opportunities. Only the city of Beijing accounts for about one third 
investment deals and amount in China in 2010, reaching a number of 189 deals out 
of 817 in total, and US$ 1.5 billion out of US$ 5.4 billion. 
Technology, Media and Telecommunication industry (TMT) is the always the most 
attractive category for the venture capital investment. These three industry categories 
share the same characteristics as the ideal target company such as high-growth, high-
risk, high-potential, and often high-technology. An example is that in a report of 
ChinaVenture Company
3
 shows that in one single year of 2006, the investment 
related to TMT far exceeded the other industries, accounting for almost two third of 
the total investment in China. Other major industries include machinery, 
biomedical/biotechnology and especially the cleantech which is ranked No.2 due to 
the growing concern of the environment and opportunities in the environment 
protection industry. 
                                                             
3 ChinaVenture Company. www.chinaventure.com.cn  
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The venture capital funds in China can be divided into three categories, namely 
foreign fund, domestic fund and joint venture. Foreign venture capitalists have been 
dominated the whole market in most of the time in the 1990’s. One example is that 
the foreign venture capital funds accounted for more than 95% of the capital raised 
in China before 1998. It is because the venture capital was relatively new in China at 
that time. Another reason is that there is no specific law for the promotion of venture 
capital, and on the contrary, rules and regulations were against the venture capital 
fundraising in the 1990’s. Example is seen as all fundraising in China must be 
approved by the People’s Bank of China, China’s central bank (Liu, 1999) but only 
few public fundraising got the permit while all private fundraising organized by 
individual or private firms was strictly prohibited. 
In the late 1990’s, the policy makers in Chinese Government began to realize that 
venture capital is an important driving force to the innovation in various industries 
and it could help China establish the technology innovation system and propel the 
economy development. In November 1999, the State Council approved and issued 
the important document, Several Opinions on Establishing a Venture Investment 
Mechanism, confirming the unique role of venture capital in the industry innovation, 
economic development and promotion of the comprehensive nation capacity. Since 
then, more and more legislation was put on the table to improve the investment 
environment.  
Domestic venture capital can be classified into two categories, namely domestic 
state-own and domestic private venture capital. The former has accounted for a 
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major proportion of the domestic venture capital investment, playing an important 
role in the China market. And the domestic state-own venture capital itself can also 
be classified into several categories in the following table. 
Classification of Domestic State-Own Venture Capital by finance sources 
1 Local Government type 
2 
Joint Venture by state-own enterprises, listed companies, high-tech industry 
parks and private companies 
3 State-own listed Holding Enterprises type 
4 State-own capital operating in foreign countries 
5 University type 
 
Source: “The history of domestic venture capital in China”. http://www.51zjxm.com/pevc/20113/vc_192826.html 
A trend in the domestic venture capital fund in line with the increasing proportion of 
its investment is the expansion of the domestic private venture capital and the 
privatization of domestic state-own venture capital in the last decade. From the graph 
below, it is clear that in 2010, the foreign venture capital, the domestic state-own 
venture capital and the domestic private venture capital accounts for one third of the 
investment respectively. 
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Source: “The history of domestic venture capital in China”. http://www.51zjxm.com/pevc/20113/vc_192826.html  
 
Look ahead, as China becomes the second largest economy, more and more 
investment, either domestic or foreign, will be made in the future. Venture capital, as 
an effective tool to the innovation and creativeness, will play a heavier role in 
propelling China’s highly value-added industries. Legislation improvement and other 
kinds of incentive such as tax reduction and rebate can definitely attract more 
talented market players to participate in the venture capital investment. 
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3. Small and Medium Enterprise Board in Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange 
The Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Board was launched in Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) in 25 June 2004 to assist small and medium companies to raise 
capital from the market. In SZSE’s website, its overview states that “SZSE is 
committed to its mission to develop China’s multi-tier capital market system. It gives 
full support to development in small and medium businesses and implementation of 
the national strategy of independent innovation.”4 
By 11 April, 2011, there are 570 listed companies on the SME Board with a total 
market value of RMB 3,592 billion.  
 11 April, 2011 
Number of Listed Companies 570 
Total Market Value RMB 3,592,496,731,613.08 
Market Capitalization RMB 1,707,846,694,878.66 
Turnover RMB 28,712,664,507.38 
Trading Volume 1,519,842 
PE Ratio 43.09 
 
Source: “The Overview of SME Board in Shenzhen Stock Exchange”. http://www.szse.cn/main/sme/  
Initial Public Offering (IPO) is the major exit mechanism for the venture capital 
funds to realize their return and profit. But before the set up of SME board, there was 
                                                             
4
 Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchange. “SZSE Overview”. 
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/aboutsse/sseoverview/  
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no place for the companies invested by venture capital, usually small and medium 
enterprises to be listed. The requirement of being listed on the main boards in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange is tailored for the large companies (most of 
them are state-own) and too high for the SME, and thus, this kind of SME had to go 
aboard for listing. The NASDAQ in the US, and Hong Kong Stock Exchange are 
two major markets for the SME.  
The policy makers in China noticed the importance of a SME board as an exit 
mechanism for the venture capital funds so they started to launch a series of research 
on the establishment of the SME board since 2000. As the SME Board was launched 
in 2004, it greatly enhanced the exit mechanism by offering a domestic exit channel 
in China. Chen Wei, a Chairman in a venture capital company in Shenzhen, added 
“After the launch of the SME Board, both the growth of local venture capital and 
fund raising activity have earned dramatic increase… (the SME board) helps the 
domestic venture capital funds grow rapidly and changes the situation of VC market  
dominated by the foreign funds … and given the fact that the liquidity and PE ratio 
in the SME Board is better than those in foreign stock exchange, the venture capital 
can earn a high return. Thus, more and more venture capital would like their target 
companies to be listed in the Shenzhen SME Board.”5 By mid of 2009, there are 72 
listed companies with a venture capital background, accounting for the 26.3% of the 
total listed companies. 
                                                             
5 Wu Ming, Wan Jing. “The establishment of SME Board in 2004 is the watershed for the domestic 
venture capital rising in China”, http://www.pedaily.cn/Item/196604.aspx  
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In conclusion, the SME Board in Shenzhen Stock Exchange not only provides the 
venture capital a more convenient, feasible, reliable and profitable exit mechanism, 
but also provides a platform for the domestic players to strengthen the power to 
challenge their foreign rivals. 
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II. Literature Review 
It is widely accepted that the virtues of venture capital funds are key driver of future 
innovation and growth. Kortum and Lerner (2000) stated that the venture capital has 
spurred innovation in the United State. There are some suggestions for their active 
participations of the venture capital funds in the value creation of the target 
companies. Barry (1990), and Megginson and Weiss (1991) argued that the venture 
capital funds play an active role in the targets such as acquiring positions in the 
board of directors to evolve the operating procedures and contracting practices. 
Warne (1988) suggested it is because the venture capitalists use their specialized 
industry or finance knowledge and contacts to help the companies recruit right staff, 
upgrade their operation and production procedure, and build the closer network with 
suppliers and customers. Jensen (1989) suggested that this “active role” of venture 
capitalists is important to reorganize and monitor the target companies.  
Venture capitalists’ close monitoring to the entrepreneurs and target companies is 
based on the venture capital’s own interest. Sahlman (1990) addressed that there are 
3 points that should be focusing on about the contract between the venture capitalists 
and the entrepreneurs. The first one is that if the venture capitalist has a clearly 
successful investment results in the past, it will be more easier for the venture 
capitalist to sign a more restrictive contract with the entrepreneurs. The second one is 
that the venture capitalists will try to minimize the agency problem by active 
participation to forbid the entrepreneur involve in the non-value-maximizing 
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activities. The last one is that the contract would be set to minimize the operation 
costs.  
In the previous work of Jain and Kini (1995), they identified that the monitoring by 
the venture capital is more effective than self-monitoring by entrepreneurs when the 
company is private and market monitoring when it goes public. Although the 
incentive of monitoring the entrepreneur is quite strong before IPO, it may be less 
after the IPO as the venture capital can easily and conveniently execute the exit 
strategy. But Jain and Kini (1995) pointed that it is unlikely that the venture capitals 
would exit immediately after the IPO because the venture capitalists have usually 
signed stringent contractual arrangements, have significant equity stake in the firm 
even after the IPO (they do so because the anticipation of the quick exit is priced in 
the IPO offering price and this will usually make the offering price become lower 
than the venture capitalists expect). 
There are four kinds of exit for the venture capitalists, which are IPOs, acquisitions, 
secondary sales, buybacks and write-offs. In the West, most venture capital funds are 
organized as limited partnerships with a limited life (Sahlman 1988). So the ultimate 
goal for the funds is to realize the returns through exit mechanism before the venture 
capital partnerships is terminated. Most private equity investors in China would 
initially expect to exit through the IPO. (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003) Cumming, 
Fleming, and Schwienbacher (2006) argued that the exit process is of central interest 
because dividends are not paid to the venture capitalists and returns are derived from 
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capital gains upon exit and thus the exit mechanism deeply affects the venture 
capitalists’ willingness to make investments.  
There is a growing literature in the West to discuss the performance of venture 
capital fund investments. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2002) and Jones and Rhodes-
Kropf (2003) studied private equity returns at the fund level. Gompers and Lerner 
(1998) looked at aggregate performance and capital flows. They found that there is a 
link between macroeconomic factors, such as past industry performance and overall 
economic performance, and capital flows into private equity. Gompers and Lerner 
shared the same point of view but added that the degree of competition in the VC 
industry would affect the valuation of individual deals. Cochrane (2003) 
characterizes venture capital returns based on the economics of individual 
investments in portfolio companies.  
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) found that the investment returns persist strongly across 
subsequent funds of a partnership as better performing partnerships are more likely 
to raise follow-on funds and larger funds. McKenzie and Janeway (2010) 
incorporated the private equity performance (PME) to compare the fund 
investments’ return with the benchmark of S&P500 and NASDAQ indices and found 
that the investments can beat the market. Levis (2011) found the evidence that PE-
backed IPOs are more profitable and efficient when compared with other IPOs both 
on absolute and industry-adjusted bases during the time frame. 
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III. Data Source and Descriptive Statistics 
The biggest obstacle to study the venture capital in China is the lack of data. 
Although there are some database focusing on China venture capital market available 
nowadays such as Zero2IPO and ChinaVenture, information about the investments 
such as investment date, investment amount and equity stake maybe missing. To 
overcome this problem, in addition to using the Zero2IPO database, I need to find 
the data from different source such as Sina Finance. Of course I also have to always 
check the accuracy of the data from various channels.  
As I want to focus on the investments using the domestic exit mechanism, the Small 
and Medium Enterprise (SME) Board, I collect all the 273 IPOs listed on the SME 
Board as the samples from Zero2IPO. The sample period is from 2004, the start of 
the board, to the end of 2008. I choose 2008 as the end because I want to compare 
the performance of VC-backed and non VC-backed companies by calculating their 
“Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR)”. (Levis, 2010) The Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Returns are generated by compounding 24 monthly (in Levis’ (2010) 
work he used 36 months. But if I use the same span of time, the sample will be much 
smaller, that is why I choose to use 24 month period) returns in addition to the first 
partial month after the first trading day.   
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During the period, there are 273 listed IPO’s6. Among them there are 77 IPOs are 
VC-backed. But 28 VC-backed IPOs in this category have missing information, and 
thus finally I can only collect 49 VC-backed IPOs with sufficient data. From May 
2005 to June 2006, the China Securities Regulatory Commission launched a reform 
and suspended all the IPOs during this period, which was so far the longest 
suspension period in China stock market. Thus the IPOs in 2005 dropped 
tremendously by 76% in the SME Board. 
 
Insert Table 1 Here. 
 
Table 2 presents the statistics of the 49 VC-backed IPOs. There is an upward trend in 
the number and investment amount of VC-backed IPO from 2004 to 2008. Maybe it 
is due to the development of the venture capital industry in China. There are in total 
82 venture capital investments for 49 target companies, which implies that usually 
more than one venture capital funds jointly invested in the same target company and 
in total there are 62 rounds of investment. 
 
Insert Table 2 Here. 
                                                             
6 Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Board, Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
http://www.szse.cn/main/sme/xqsj/jbzb/  
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As a venture capital fund usually has a limited life span for the limited partnerships, 
the duration of the investment is also very important for the fund. It is because that 
there is only very limited information about when the venture capital funds would 
exit, I assume that the fund would realize the return right after the IPO. Thus the hold 
period is assumed from the injection of cash to the first trading day in the SME board. 
I find that the holding periods vary across the investments. 
 
Insert Table 3 Here. 
 
In my sample of the 82 investments, the first one was made was in 1999. There are 
62 rounds of investment from 1999 to 2007, which implies that there are 13 rounds 
of investment having more than one venture capital involved in. There are 3 venture 
capital funds participated in the same round of investment at most. Table 4 presents 
that although there is still some venture capital funds made investments in the early 
and late stage, most of them invested in the growth stage (62% of the identified 
samples). Table 5 shows the investment statistics in each year from 1999 to 2007. 
Although the number of investment varies, the average investment amount is in an 
increasing trend. 
 
Insert Table 4 Here. 
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Insert Table 5 Here. 
 
As I have pointed out in the section above that in the China market the most 
attractive industries for the venture capital are Technology, Media and 
Telecommunication (TMT), others like cleantech and biomedical/biotechnology are 
also popular. In my samples, the high-tech industry such as electronics, computer 
and information technology takes the largest proportion in the distribution, no matter 
the IPOs are classified by Shenzhen Stock Exchange or Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC). Beside the high-tech industry, the mechanical industry also 
accounts for a large part around one fourth. 
 
Insert Table 6 Here. 
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IV. Methodology 
The purpose in this paper is to evaluate the performance of the venture capital funds 
and venture capital-backed IPOs in China market. The research papers of the US 
venture capital always incorporate the S&P 500 and NASDAQ as the benchmark 
(McKenzie and Janeway, 2011). Similarly, the benchmarks I use are the Shanghai 
Composite Index and the Shenzhen Composite Index managed by the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange respective as the counterparts. These two indices trace all 
the listed companies in these two stock exchanges and can reflect the general 
situation in the whole stock market.  
 
1. Venture Capital Fund Performance Compared to Public 
Equity Performance 
Although the venture capital funds can exit the investments by means of secondary 
sale or acquisition, they usually face the illiquidity of the investments before the 
IPOs. Furthermore, their investments are very risky and thus the results are always 
unpredictable. To compensate the illiquidity, unpredictability and risk of the 
investments, it is no doubted that the realized return of the successful IPO should be 
high enough for venture capital to survive. Thus, the VC-backed IPO should 
outperform the public equity performance.  
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In this section, I will first calculate the investment multiple and annual rate of return 
for each investment by the venture capital. As I discuss in above, there is only very 
limited information about when the venture capital funds would exit, I assume that 
the fund would realize the return right after the IPO. So the investment multiple is 
the fund’s total stock value of the IPO at the end of the first trading day divided by 
the cash injected into the target company. And the annual rate of return is to 
annualize the multiple into yearly rate of return across each investment holding 
period. 
Next I report the performance of venture capital compared to public equity 
performance by incorporating the Public Market Equivalent (PME) metric. Similar to 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and McKenzie and Janeway (2011) papers, I implement 
the PME calculation by investing (or discounting) the fund’s total disbursement 
(total cash outflows) in a hypothetical fund formed by a benchmark index (Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Composite Index) and compare it to the realized total return (total cash 
inflow net of fees) in a specific range of time.  
Assuming that a fund made total investment of RMB 1 million (after discounting) in 
different target companies in January 2001, and it realized the return of RMB 3 
millions in December 2006. The IRR in this case is 20.09%. Across the same period 
of time, the Shanghai Composite Index rose from 2065.6 to 2675.5. Thus the fund 
could realize the profit of RMB 1.295 million (or RMB 1 million × 2675.5 / 2065.6) 
from investing in the hypothetical index fund. Thus the PME is 2.32 (or 3 / 1.295). A 
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PME of greater than one signifies that the venture capital fund outperform the 
benchmark.  
 
2. The Performance of VC-Backed And Non VC-Backed 
IPOs 
Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Brav and Gompers (1997) pointed out 
that in the US, both the VC-backed and non VC-backed IPOs are at 
underperformance compared to the benchmark such as S&P500 index. Moreover, 
they stated that the stock price of VC-backed IPOs would perform better than the 
non VC-backed IPOs in aftermarket. In this section, I want to test whether this 
hypothesis is also applicable in the China domestic stock market.  
Firstly, I use the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) to test the long term 
aftermarket performance of VC-backed, non VC-backed and all IPOs. BHAR of 
each IPO is generated by compounding 24 monthly in addition to the first partial 
month after the first trading day. The reason I just compound the return in the 
following 24 months instead of 36 or even 60 months in other papers (see (Levis, 
2011)) is that the ending date of the sample period is too close to the present day. 
Our sample period started in 2004 and ended in 2008, so if I compound 36 monthly 
returns, the sample period would just span about 4 years with about 200 total 
samples, which is too few for the study.  
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where rit and rbt are the raw returns on IPO i and the selected benchmark b at event 
month t. BHAR is reported for benchmarks: the Small and Medium Enterprise Index 
(SME). BHARs can be equally or value-weighted.  
Second, I will incorporate the Wealth Relative (WR) provided by Ritter (1991) to 
compare the VC-backed IPO portfolio returns to the benchmark’s return. Non VC-
backed portfolio IPO return can also be compared to the benchmark’s. The 
advantage of this measurement is that the VC-backed and non VC-backed IPO can 
also be compared by their compounding returns. Actually the WR is a ratio. If WR is 
larger 1, the IPO portfolio is superior to the benchmark. To calculate the IPO 
portfolio return, I first compound the 24 monthly returns of each group (VC-backed 
or non VC-backed) of IPO, then calculate the arithmetic or geometric average of this 
compounded 24-month-return. 
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where the WRt is the wealth relative at period t, rit is calculated by compounding the 
following 24 monthly returns of IPO i during the period of t. rbt is calculated by 
compounding the following 24 monthly returns of the benchmark (the Small and 
Medium Enterprise Index).  
 
3. Cross-Sectional Regression Model 
There are some factors that may affect the return of the venture capital investments. 
These factors include the duration of the investment, investment amount, the share 
proportion owned by the venture capital after the IPO, the PE ratios before and after 
the IPO, and at what stage the venture capital made the investment. To address this 
issue, cross-sectional regression analysis is made.  
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where LINVEST is logarithm of the investment amount, SHARE_AFT_IPO is VC’s 
share proportion after the IPO, LYEAR is the logarithm of the investment duration 
before the IPO, PE_INVEST is the PE ratio of the Shenzhen Composite Index when 
the investment takes place, PE_IPO is the PE ratio at the IPO first trading day, and 
finally the GDROWTH is a dummy variable, if DGROWTH equals 1, it means the 
investment is made at the growth stage. If DGROWTH equals 0, it means the 
investment is not made at the growth stage. 
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V. Results 
Investment multiple and annual return rate of return are two key indicators to 
compare the performance between venture capital funds. Table 7 and Table 8 present 
summaries of these indicators of performance. Table 9 is the multiple and annual rate 
of return of the benchmarks, Shanghai Composite Index and Shenzhen Composite 
Index. All average number used in the section are equally weighted. In Table 7, the 
average investment multiple is 27.18, which are larger than the investment multiple 
of investing in the hypothetical public equity funds of Shanghai Composite Index 
and Shenzhen Composite Index. The multiples of these two hypothetical funds are 
2.01 and 2.13. Thus, I conclude that if a VC-backed company can be successfully 
listed on the SME Board, its return is far larger than that invested in the benchmark 
index fund or related ETF.  
 
Insert Table 7 Here. 
 
Insert Table 8 Here. 
 
Insert Table 9 Here. 
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Comparing the results in China and the US based on the results from McKenzie and 
Janeway (2010), I find that the investment multiple in the SME Board is superior to 
that in the US which is about 4.38 for the terminated and effectively terminated 
funds with the sample period from 1980 through 2006. All what can say is that the 
VC-backed companies in China earn “prestige” when they are listed on the stock 
exchange as the maximum multiple is 319.69, a super high figure and the minimum 
reaches 3.04, almost the average of the terminated funds. 
In Table 7, the multiple is not related to the duration of the venture capital 
investments, and thus in Table 8, I annualized the multiple to annual rate of return. 
The results are similar to the multiples. The average annual rate of return is 975%, 
which is a very large number meaning that on average, each investment is having 10-
times return annually. While the average annual rate of return of two hypothetical 
funds are 45% and 52% respectively. Again, the result here outperforms that in the 
US. The IRR of the S&P500 and NASDAQ is only 12% and 16%.  
Both the performance indicators show that the VC-backed IPOs are outperform the 
hypothetical public equity funds in China, and also surpass the indicators of the US 
VC-backed IPOs. But one thing needed to be notice is that the large number of the 
results is heavily related to some outliers in the sample. For example, the maximum 
annual rate of return of the VC-backed IPO is 24099%. This kind of extreme number 
is generated in the form that the venture capital can realize the return in a very short 
time less than one year. But the fact is that the realized return is based on the 
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assumption that the venture capital funds would realize the return at the first IPO 
trading day. 
The 2-year compounding results from comparing the non VC-backed IPOs’ 
performance with non VC-backed IPOs’ after they were listed show that the VC-
backed IPOs outperform the non-VC backed IPOs in both of the Buy-and-Hold-
Abnormal Return (BHAR) and Wealth Relatives (WR) measurements. As we can 
see in table 10, in the first measurement, both portfolios underperform the 
benchmark, the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Index as the figures are less 
than zero. The two-year BHAR for non VC-backed portfolio is -0.460, while the 
BHAR for VC-backed portfolio is -0.432, 6% larger than the non VC-backed 
portfolio. Thus, the VC-backed portfolio show a better result as its two-year BHAR 
is larger.  
For the Wealth Relatives (WR), the two-year WR for non VC-backed portfolio is 
0.679 while the WR for VC-backed portfolio is 0.737, almost 9% better than the non 
VC-backed portfolio. Like the BHAR, if the figure of WR is less than 1, it implies 
that the portfolio’s performance is worse than the benchmark’s. Not surprisingly, the 
WRs for both portfolios show that they perform worse than the benchmark as we can 
observe in the BHAR case. 
 
Insert Table 9 Here. 
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There are three regression models in Table 11. Independent variables in Model 1 
include logarithm of the investment amount (LINVEST), the venture capital’s share 
proportion after the IPO (SHARE_AFT_IPO) and the logarithm of the venture 
capital investment duration before the IPO (LYEAR). I group these three 
independent variables in Model 1 because these are factors that are relevant to the 
investment deal. In Model 2 I add the PE ratio of the Shenzhen Composite Index of 
the month of investment made and of the month at first trading day (PE_INVEST 
and PE_IPO). These two factors reflect the market atmosphere. Finally in Model 3, I 
put the dummy DGROWTH. If it equals 1, it means that the VC made the investment 
at the target company’s growth stage. Otherwise, the VC invest in the early or late 
stage. 
The results in all 3 models of the regression show that LINVEST is negatively 
related to the multiple, with significance in 1%, meaning that the larger the 
investment, the lower the return for the VC. Moreover, in Model 2 and 3, the 
PE_IPO shows positive relation with the multiple with significance in 5%. This is 
consistent what McKenzie and Janeway (2011) say in their paper that “The optimal 
scenario is one in which the VC exits when there is a high demand for venture IPOs”. 
When there is a high demand for the IPO, usually the market atmosphere is hot, i.e. a 
high PE ratio. When the market is hot, it is likely that the closing price in the first 
trading day is good, and then the VC can realize a better return. 
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VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, I try to study the performance of venture capital in China relative to the 
public equity market, and to compare the performance of the VC-backed and non 
VC-backed IPOs as I use the Small and Medium Enterprise Index in Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange as benchmark. At the same time, I also compare the performance of both 
of the portfolios with the benchmark by manually creating a simulated benchmark 
index. The benchmark I use here are the Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index. 
All the results show that if the target company can be successfully listed on the local 
stock market, i.e. the Small and Medium Enterprise Board in the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, the return of each this IPO can beat the market. At the same time, it is not 
surprised that all VC-backed IPOs in China outperform their counterpart in the US. 
This may be due to the higher PE ratio in the SME board.  
The result of the comparison of the VC-backed and non VC-backed IPOs shows that 
the VC-backed IPOs outperform the non VC-backed ones.  
Also I regress the return (investment multiple) on a set of independent variables such 
as length of the investment, investment amount, PE ratio of the IPOs, etc. Among 
them the logarithm of the investment amount and the PE ratio of the Shenzhen 
Composite Index of the month in which the VC-backed IPO were listed are 
significant. The former is negatively related but the later is positively related to the 
investment multiple. 
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Overall, we can see that during the research period, despite the insignificant 
difference, the VC-backed IPOs still earn an advantage comparing to the non VC-
backed IPOs. Deeper research can be conducted on the field of how the Venture 
Capital funds help the VC-backed IPOs before they go listed.  
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Table 1. Annual Distribution of IPOs by Number. 
The total sample of 273 IPOs in the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Board in 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange consists of 196 non venture capital backed (non VC-
backed) and 77 venture capital backed (VC-backed) from June 2004 to December 
2008. Among the VC-backed IPOs, only 49 have information available in the 
Zero2IPO database. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for the VC-backed IPOs 
The number of observation show there is more or less a growing trend in the venture capital investments in terms of numbers 
of IPO and investment amount. There are in total 82 venture capital funds make investments in 49 observed companies, 
which implies that usually more than one venture capital jointly invested in the same target company. 
Year 
No. of VC-
backed 
IPOs 
Funds invested 
in VC-backed 
IPOs 
Total Investment 
Amount (RMB 
000’s) 
Average Amount 
(RMB 000’s) 
Median 
(RMB 000’s) 
St.Dev. 
(RMB 
000’s) 
2004 4 10 46,036.8 4,603.68 4,264.2 4,461.99 
2005 0 NA NA NA NA NA 
2006 10 15 57,338.7 3,822.58 4,770.1 2,517.2 
2007 18 33 644,880 19,541.81818 10,721 23,916.19 
2008 17 24 412,973.6 17,207.23333 10,397 20,957.23 
Total 49 82 1,161,229.1 14,161.33049 9,135.5 20,309.79 
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Table 3. The Holding Period of the Venture Capital Investments 
The holding period of venture capital is assumed from the cash injection to the target 
companies to the first trading day. The holding periods vary across the investments. 
 
Holding Period (years) No. of Investment 
0 to 1 9 
1 to 2 25 
2 to 3 10 
3 to 4 12 
4 to 5 4 
5 to 6 12 
6 to 7 9 
7 to 8 1 
Total 82 
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Table 4. Investment Intensity by Investment Year 
This table shows that the investment intensity by investment year. The first investment appeared in the 1999. Most of the 
investments were made during the growth stage of the target companies. Statistics also shows that the majority of funds 
invested the target companies in the first round (round A). 
 
Year 
No. of VC-
backed IPOs 
Funds invested in 
VC-backed IPOs 
Round Stage 
A B C D Early  Growth Late Unidentified 
2004 4 10 8 2 0 0 0 5 0 5 
2006 10 15 14 1 0 0 10 3 1 1 
2007 18 33 23 6 2 2 1 21 11 0 
2008 17 24 21 1 2 0 1 18 5 0 
Total 49 82 66 10 4 2 12 47 17 6 
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Table 5. Yearly Investment Statistics 
Table 5 shows the investment statistics in each year from 1999 to 2007. Although the 
number of investment varies, the average investment amount is in an increasing trend. 
 
Year 
Number of 
Fund 
Investment 
Investment Amount (RMB 000's) 
Total Average St. Dev. Highest Lowest 
1999 1 4,388.40 4,388.40 - 4,388.40 4,388.40 
2000 12 89,506.80 7,458.90 5,486.25 20,037.60 1,490.40 
2001 19 213,458.35 11,234.65 10,382.85 40,654.80 414.00 
2002 2 24,094.80 12,047.40 4,156.94 14,986.80 9,108.00 
2003 7 101,354.40 14,479.20 7,210.98 27,000.00 8,362.80 
2004 2 27,655.20 13,827.60 1,639.36 14,986.80 12,668.40 
2005 8 207,230.08 25,903.76 19,109.88 5,022.00 55,807.20 
2006 23 423,446.10 18,410.70 28,699.64 2,346.00 143,938.00 
2007 8 257,698.24 32,212.28 37,418.08 1,963.00 117,551.10 
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Table 6. Industry Distribution of the IPOs 
The first classification is based on the categories provided by Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange while the second one is based on the Standard Industrial Classification 
(classified by the author). Both classifications show that High-tech industry accounts 
for the largest proportion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry Classification by SIC 
No. of 
IPOs Percentage 
10 Metal Mining 1 2.04% 
15 Building Construction - General Contractors & Operative 
Builders 1 2.04% 
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 1 2.04% 
26 Paper and Allied Products 1 2.04% 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 9 18.37% 
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 2 4.08% 
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery & Transport 
Equipment 3 6.12% 
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 11 22.45% 
36 Electronic, Electrcal Equipment & Components, Excpt 
Computer Equipment 13 26.53% 
41 Local, Suburban Transit & Interurbn Hgwy Passenger Transport 1 2.04% 
73 Business Services 6 12.24% 
 Total 49 100.00% 
Industry Classification by Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange 
No. of 
IPOs Percentage 
B. Mining 1 2.04% 
C3. Paper and Printing 1 2.04% 
C4. Petroleum Chemistry and Plastic 6 12.24% 
C5. Electronics 9 18.37% 
C6. Metal/Non Metal 5 10.20% 
C7. Mechanical 13 26.53% 
C8. Pharmaceutical and Biological 
Technology 2 4.08% 
C9. Other Manufacturing 1 2.04% 
E. Construction 1 2.04% 
G. Information Technology 8 16.33% 
K. Social Services 2 4.08% 
Total 49 100% 
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Table 7. Performance Summary of Investment Multiple of Venture Capital Funds 
Table 7 is the summary statistics of the investment multiple of venture capital funds. The investment multiple is a ratio of 
realized return at the first IPO trading day over the total investment amount. These metrics are also estimated for the top 
decile of funds and database excluding the top decile and quintile of funds. A summary of the funds by vintage year is also 
provided to observe the performance of funds over years. 
 
  Average Median St. Dev.  Skewness 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile  Max. Min. 
Fund Investment Multiple 27.18 16.36 40.99 5.18 9.85 31.29 319.69 3.04 
    Top decile only 113.47 87.59 92.74 1.85 49.02 135.14 319.69 44.61 
    Excluding top decile 17.85 14.45 11.61 0.801 9.61 25.59 44.2 3.04 
    Excluding top quantile 13.81 11.6 7.46 0.509 9.03 19.11 31.29 3.04 
1999 26.45 26.45 NA NA NA NA 26.45 26.45 
2000 35.22 22.94 36.46 2.76 16.36 43.31 143.76 9.61 
2001 33.43 11.67 70.25 4.17 10.63 27.5 319.69 4.5 
2002 27.08 27.08 23.66 NA 10.34 43.81 43.81 10.34 
2003 26.98 32.64 16.05 0.408 10.24 34.15 53.21 9.48 
2004 25.43 25.43 2.72 NA 23.51 27.35 27.35 23.51 
2005 39.86 32.37 36.99 2.26 17.83 40.82 10.36 126.52 
2006 17.68 13.64 23.58 4.08 4.94 19.2 120.53 3.04 
2007 15.66 5.24 19.85 1.6 4.91 23.41 54.65 3.51 
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Table 8. Performance Summary of Annual Rate of Return of Venture Capital Funds 
Table 8 is the summary statistics of the annual rate of return of venture capital funds. The annual rate of return is the 
annualized investment multiple. These metrics are also estimated for the top decile of funds and database excluding the top 
decile and quintile of funds. A summary of the funds by vintage year is also provided to observe the performance of funds 
over years. 
 
  Average Median St. Dev.  Skewness 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile  Max. Min. 
Annual Rate of Return 975% 162% 3380% 5.70 86% 389% 24099% 30% 
    Top decile only 7728% 3320% 8625% 1.35 1855% 13073% 24099% 1229% 
    Excluding top decile 245% 146% 252% 1.91 83% 317% 1226% 30% 
    Excluding top quantile 149% 125% 94% 0.94 77% 190% 389% 30% 
1999 87% 87% NA NA NA NA 87% 87% 
2000 82% 79% 23% 1.27 62% 85% 131% 59% 
2001 100% 86% 57% 1.19 56% 142% 255% 30% 
2002 80% 80% 47% NA 47% 123% 123% 47% 
2003 126% 131% 36% -1.21 112% 146% 170% 57% 
2004 160% 160% 126% NA 142% 179% 179% 142% 
2005 460% 366% 286% 0.37 210% 783% 807% 155% 
2006 1825% 678% 3879% 3.67 317% 1229% 17793% 102% 
2007 3749% 367% 8321% 2.71 269% 2184% 24099% 251% 
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Table 9. Performance of the Public Equity Market Relative to Venture Capital Funds 
I create two hypothetical funds using the Shanghai Composite Index and Shenzhen Composite Index. This table show the 
performance indicators, the investment multiple and annual rate of return of investing in these two hypothetical funds. 
 
SHENZHEN Average Median St. Dev.  Skewness 25th Percentile 75th Percentile  Max. Min. 
Shenzhen Composite Index Multiple 2.13 1.54 1.43 0.77 0.94 2.97 5.23 0.51 
    Excluding top decile 1.86 1.44 1.17 0.76 0.87 2.65 4.5 0.51 
    Excluding top quintile 1.43 1.25 0.75 0.61 0.74 2 2.97 0.51 
Shenzhen Composite Index Annual  52% 20% 77% 133% -2% 89% 316% -46% 
   Excluding top decile 34% 13% 55% 123% -2% 58% 169% -46% 
   Excluding top quintile 14% 14% 29% 101% -6% 28% 89% -46% 
 
 
SHANGHAI Average Median St. Dev.  Skewness 25th Percentile 75th Percentile  Max. Min. 
Shanghai Composite Index Multiple 2.01 1.65 1.2 0.68 1.02 2.98 4.55 0.54 
    Excluding top decile 1.77 1.47 0.97 0.7 1.02 2.51 3.92 0.54 
    Excluding top quintile 1.44 1.24 0.67 0.64 0.859 1.97 2.98 0.54 
Shanghai Composite Index Annual  45% 14% 67% 128% 2% 77% 252% -44% 
    Excluding top decile 31% 8% 50% 128% 2% 51% 147% -44% 
    Excluding top quintile 12% 5% 24% 94% -3% 20% 77% -44% 
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Table 10. The Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) and Wealth Relatives 
(WR) for Non VC-Backed IPO Portfolio and VC-Backed IPO Portfolio 
Table 10 compares the non VC-backed and VC-backed portfolio by using the buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) and wealth relatives (WR), which are two 
indicators used by some papers before. Both the BHAR and WR show that VC-
backed portfolio outperforms the non VC-backed, but the two portfolio perform 
worse than the benchmark, the Small and Medium Enterprise index. 
 
 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) 
Non VC-Backed Portfolio VC-Backed Portfolio 
-0.460 -0.432 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wealth Relatives (WR) 
Non VC-Backed Portfolio VC-Backed Portfolio 
0.679 0.737 
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Table 11. Multivariate Cross-Sectional Regressions of the Investment Multiple 
of the VC-Backed IPOs 
The dependent variable is the investment multiple. The independent variables are 
logarithm of the investment amount (LINVEST), the VC’s share proportion after the 
IPO (SHARE_AFT_IPO), the logarithm of the investment duration before IPO 
(LYEAR), the PE ratio of the Shenzhen Composite Index at the investment day 
(PE_INVEST) and PE ratio of the same index at the IPO’s first trading day (PE_IPO) 
and the dummy DGROWTH. If DGROWTH equals 1, it means that the VC made 
investment at the growth stage. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
LINVEST 
-35.63 -44.75 -43.401 
(12.38)*** (12.99)*** (13.11)*** 
SHARE_AFT_IPO 
84.59 103.80 114.470 
(92.08) (91.16) (92.10) 
LYEAR 
6.68 9.91 14.221 
(16.69) (18.21) (18.89) 
PE_INVEST 
  0.10 -0.00397 
  (0.43) (0.45) 
PE_IPO 
  0.56 0.546 
  (0.27)** (0.268)** 
DGROWTH 
    -8.427 
    (9.558) 
Intercept 
268.02 301.18 298.751 
(86.55)*** (90.87)*** (91.04)*** 
        
Adjusted R-square 0.094 0.124 0.121 
N 82 82 82 
F value 3.79 3.29 2.86 
 
 
 
